Out of Time, Out of Luck – Procurement Challenge Dismissed on Limitation Grounds

On 3 November 2026, the High Court awarded summary judgment for the defendant in the case of Verity Healthcare Ltd v Cambridgeshire County Council [2026] EWHC 2830 (TCC).

For both suppliers and contracting authorities, the decision provides clarity on the operation of the limitation provisions under the Procurement Act 2023. It confirms that the courts are likely to expect bidders to engage actively with procurement documents from the point they are published and to move quickly if they intend to challenge a procurement decision.

With short limitation periods under the Procurement Act 2023, early specialist advice can be critical to protecting your position and preserving potential grounds of challenge. To discuss how these developments may affect your organisation, please contact a member of our procurement team.

Key takeaways

• Ensure all evidence in any application is clear, transparent, accurate and consistent. This case shows that an adverse inference can be made as a result of inconsistent and incomplete accounts, so it is important to obtain a record of exactly what happened at the earliest stage and provide a clear, consistent explanation
• The court may well be unwilling or even lack jurisdiction to make orders compelling a contracting authority to conduct a procurement in a particular way by way of interim relief. Any application for interim relief should go no further than is required to secure the challenger’s interests and protect their position until the claim is resolved.
• Providers should actively monitor Find a Tender, use alert systems and review Tender documents immediately they are published.
• Do not delay in issuing proceedings, even if correspondence is ongoing. Claims can be issued protectively in order to not risk out-of-time applications.
• There have now been two decisions on the automatic suspension/interim relief under the Act, with judges potentially taking slightly different approaches. This area of law is likely to continue to develop given its significance to both bidders and contracting authorities.

Background of the case

The defendant council sought to procure a regulated homecare service to be provided to adults across Cambridgeshire using the competitive flexible procedure under the Procurement Act 2023 (the “Act”). The Tender Notice was published on 15 July 2026.

One of the conditions of participation required providers to hold a CQC rating or “Good” or above. Verity did not hold a CQC rating of “Good” or above.

On 17 August 2026, Verity issued its claim, alleging that this requirement was disproportionate and contrary to the conditions of participation found in section 22 of the Act. Verity also applied for an interim order that the council continue with the procurement without implementing the requirement for a “Good” CQC rating so as to exclude or prejudice Verity, or alternatively, to suspend the operation of the condition or the procurement, pending a determination.

In response, the council applied for strike out of the claim and/or summary judgment. It was the council’s position that the claim was issued outside of the 30-day limitation period under section 106 of the Act.

The issue of limitation

Verity claimed in response that it first became aware of the procurement and the CQC requirement on 19 July 2026. However, the council raised evidence that Verity accessed the tender portal on 18 July 2026 and registered an expression of interest.

The court found that, on the evidence available, Verity had actual knowledge of the procurement by 18 July 2026 and that this was, at the latest, when it ought to have known of the challenged condition. More fundamentally, it held that Verity reasonably ought to have known of the procurement and the condition when the Tender Notice was published, and that Verity had constructive knowledge, triggering the start of the limitation period, on 15 July 2026. Although Verity claimed that the tender portal had changed and that it did not have alerts set up on the new portal, the court held that alerts could have been set up through Find a Tender or Google, and a provider is responsible for accessing and reviewing tender documents.

Although reference was made to a possible retrospective extension of time under section 106(3) of the Act in Verity’s Particulars of Claim and skeleton argument, the claim form did not seek this relief and no formal application was made by Verity. The court concluded that any such application would have been refused in any event. Verity had written to the council on 21 July 2026 to challenge the CQC requirement and received a rejection on 11 August 2026. The court held that there was no reason why Verity could not have prepared and issued proceedings within the limitation period. Waiting for the council’s response did not justify delay in escalating to legal proceedings, and the claim could have still been issued immediately upon receipt of the response and be within time.

The court therefore concluded that the claim was out of time and entered summary judgment for the defendant.

Accuracy of evidence

Despite numerous successive witness statements on behalf of Verity, the court held that the evidence on when and how Verity discovered the terms of the procurement repeatedly changed and these inconsistent and incomplete accounts “sought to obfuscate the issue”. Given the volume of evidence already served, the court drew an adverse inference and found no realistic prospect that further evidence would establish that Verity lacked knowledge of the CQC rating condition until 19 July 2026.

Interim relief

Although the claim failed on limitation, the judge still considered the application for interim relief and held that it would have been refused.

The court queried whether it would have jurisdiction to make an interim order which dictated the way in which a contracting authority should run its procurement and considered only whether interim relief should be granted so as to suspend the procurement pending determination of the claim.

The court considered the test under section 102 of the Act and held that there is no hierarchy between the factors for the court to consider – the fact that public interest is the first in the list does not give it automatic priority. The court’s approach may have differed somewhat from that taken in Parkingeye Limited v Velindre University NHS Trust & Anor [2026] EWHC 1019 (TCC), where it was suggested that lifting a suspension would generally require either a “very persuasive countervailing public interest” or an “overriding” private interest.

In Verity, the judge noted that the decision in Parkingeye came close to giving priority to the public interest factor in lawful procurement, whereas section 102 requires a case-specific balancing exercise. The court held that in the event that the claim had proceeded, damages would have been an adequate remedy for Verity, and suspension risked disrupting both the council’s and other bidder’s timeline. As such, the council would have been permitted to continue the procurement and enter into the contract even if the claim had continued.

Contact us

With procurement disputes increasingly testing the scope and application of the Procurement Act 2023, early legal advice is often critical to protecting your position. Whether you are a contracting authority seeking to defend a challenge or a supplier considering one, our procurement specialists can help you assess your options, manage risk and respond quickly to emerging issues.